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Abstract 
Current animal models of episodic memory are usually based on demonstrating 
integrated memory for what happened, where it happened, and when an event took place. 
These models aim to capture the testable features of the definition of human episodic memory 
which stresses the temporal component of the memory as a unique piece of source information 
that allows us to disambiguate one memory from another. Recently though, it has been 
suggested that a more accurate model of human episodic memory would include contextual 
rather than temporal source information, as humans’ memory for time is relatively poor. Here, 
two experiments were carried out investigating human memory for temporal and contextual 
source information, along with the underlying dual process retrieval processes, using an 
immersive virtual environment paired with a ‘Remember-Know’ memory task. Experiment 1 (n 
= 28) showed that contextual information could only be retrieved accurately using recollection, 
while temporal information could be retrieved using either recollection or familiarity. 
Experiment 2 (n = 24), which used a more difficult task, resulting in reduced item recognition 
rates and therefore less potential for contamination by ceiling effects, replicated the pattern of 
results from Experiment 1. Dual process theory predicts that it should only be possible to 
retrieve source context from an event using recollection, and our results are consistent with this 
prediction. That temporal information can be retrieved using familiarity alone suggests that it 
may be incorrect to view temporal context as analogous to other typically used source contexts. 
This latter finding supports the alternative proposal that time since presentation may simply be 
reflected in the strength of memory trace at retrieval – a measure ideally suited to trace 
strength interrogation using familiarity, as is typically conceptualised within the dual process 
framework.  
 
Keywords: Episodic memory; time; context; recollection; familiarity  
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1. Introduction 
The episodic memory system has been proposed to underpin our abilities to retrieve 
temporal-spatial relations between events, the subjective experience of reliving an event, 
autonoetic consciousness (Tulving, 1983), and mental time travel (Suddendorf & Busby, 2003).  
As conscious recollection and mental time travel are difficult to demonstrate in non-human 
animals, some researchers have suggested that episodic memory is a uniquely human cognitive 
ability (Suddendorf & Busby, 2003; Tulving, 2002). The utility of animal models is clear, as they 
allow for the study of episodic memory on a cellular and neural level currently not attainable in 
humans. Consequently a broad body of research has focused on the content, rather than the 
experience, of episodic memory to develop animal models (Clayton & Dickinson, 1998; Eacott & 
Easton, 2012) with almost exclusive emphasis placed on the integration of what happened, 
where it happened, and when (Clayton & Dickinson, 1998) or on which occasion it happened 
(Eacott & Easton, 2010; Eacott & Norman, 2004). According to these criteria, episodic memory 
and has been reported in rats (Eacott & Norman, 2004; Langston & Wood, 2010; Ergorul & 
Eichenbaum, 2004; Babb & Crystal, 2005, 2006; Kart-Teke et al. 2006), mice (Davis et al. 2013), 
birds (Clayton & Dickinson, 1998), chimpanzees (Martin-Ordas et al. 2013) and cuttlefish (Jozet-
Alves et al. 2013). In the absence of a demonstration of subjective experience to definitively 
show correspondence across animal and human memory systems, the memory capability 
demonstrated in the what-where-when (WWWhen) and what-where-which (WWWhich) 
memory paradigms has been termed episodic-like memory (Clayton & Dickinson, 1998).  
The use of these episodic-like memory paradigms has led to further debate as to 
whether events are separated in memory using solely temporal information, as suggested by 
WWWhen memory (Babb & Crystal, 2005, 2006; Clayton & Dickinson, 1998; Ergorul & 
Eichenbaum, 2004; Roberts et al., 2008; Zhou & Crystal, 2009) or by the occasion in which they 
took place using either temporal or non-temporal identifiers, suggested by WWWhich memory 
(Eacott & Easton, 2010, 2012; Easton & Eacott, 2008). In spite of their central role within the 
widely used WWWhen paradigm, humans rarely use specific temporal cues when remembering 
episodes, relying instead on non-temporal information e.g. information about the weather, 
people who were there, and environmental context (Friedman, 1993; Wagenaar, 1986; Wells et 
al. 2014). Clearly, both temporal and non-temporal identifiers of an event can be thought of as 
sources that specify conditions under which memories were encoded (Johnson et al. 1993), and 
can be interrogated using standard human memory paradigms.  
To date, relatively few attempts have been made to assess the construct validity of the 
WWWhen or WWWhich paradigms by testing them within humans. Previous research with 
human participants has shown that while memory for both temporal and contextual 
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information can be accurate (Easton, Webster, & Eacott, 2012; Holland & Smulders, 2011), the 
two models engage different retrieval processes within the dual process framework (Easton et 
al., 2012). Dual process theory states that memory can be retrieved using two processes, 
recollection and/or familiarity (for reviews, see Vilberg & Rugg, 2008, and Yonelinas, 2002). 
Within this framework, a memory supported by recollection is retrieved alongside its source, 
which unambiguously supports the recognition judgement. Familiarity, on the other hand, does 
not result in source retrieval—merely the awareness that the recognised stimulus relates to 
something from the past. These processes are often assessed using what is known as a 
Remember/Know (R/K) procedure in which participants are given a recognition memory test 
for items and/or sources seen during a study phase (c.f. Jacoby, 1991). For correctly identified 
items Remember and Know responses are given, where Remember corresponds to the process 
of recollection and Know to the process of familiarity (Dewhurst et al. 2009). Given this 
established operationalisation of the dual processes, the only retrieval process capable of 
supporting source information is recollection. Melding the two discussed sets of frameworks, it 
should therefore be expected that the temporal source component of WWWhen memories, and 
the contextual source component of WWWhich memories would both necessarily recruit 
recollection. This has led some researchers to suggest that recollection is truly episodic, while 
familiarity, which does not require the retrieval of an integrated memory of multiple features of 
an event, is not (Clayton & Dickinson, 1998; Easton et al., 2012)1.  
Easton et al. (2012) examined retrieval processes in human participants by projecting 
images of abstract figures on either a zebra or a checked background on to a large screen in a 
lecture theatre. They showed that accurate retrieval of contextual information was possible only 
using recollection. They also showed that, contrary to what would be expected within the dual 
process framework, memory for the order of stimulus presentation could be retrieved 
accurately using either recollection or familiarity. This finding questions the WWWhen model’s 
assumptions of the integrity of temporal source cues to episodic memory, at least in humans. 
Moreover, it suggests that retrieval of temporal sources should not be treated as equivalent to 
contextual sources within the WWWhich model. There was an alternative explanation for the 
familiarity-supported temporal source component which is that familiarity judgments can be 
supported using memory strength (i.e. how little the encoding episode had decayed from 
memory indicating how recently it was encountered) rather than the retrieval of a true 
temporal source.  We sought to conceptually replicate these findings using a longer sequence of 
                                                        
1
 It is worth noting that this episodic/non-episodic distinction revisits Tulving’s (1983) original formulation of 
recollection as episodic and familiarity as semantic. Human memory researchers have since interpreted both 
processes as episodic within the dual process framework (e.g. since Yonelinas, 2001), making this an area in 
which there is little consensus across animal and human memory research. 
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time points both during study and test (6 time points compared to 2). This allowed us to 
examine the nature of the errors produced when attempting to use temporal source 
judgements. If temporal source questions were being solved using memory strength rather than 
retrieval of the precise temporal source then we would expect incorrect responses to cluster 
around the position of the correct response within the sequence of presentation at encoding. We 
additionally used an immersive testing environment to more closely match the conditions under 
which temporal source has been shown to be integral to episodic memory in animals. 
To this end, we assessed time and context retrieval in an immersive virtual environment 
using an amended version of the standard Remember-Know procedure (Dewhurst et al., 2009; 
Donaldson et al. 1996), with the only difference being that we asked for ‘Familiar’ instead of 
‘Know’ responses in order to distinguish between the two familiarity processes suggested by 
Dewhurst et al. (2009).  Over two experiments, we used a paradigm, in which participants 
moved through, and encountered a series of 3D objects in a virtual environment. We made the 
environment as immersive as possible by projecting it onto a wall in a darkened room, which 
was intended to give a strong sense of being present within the environment. During the study, 
participants encountered objects in different weather contexts and at different times (points in 
a sequence). Their memory for the items and their temporal or contextual sources was assessed 
alongside a judgement of recollective experience: Remember judgements indicating that 
participants could retrieve details surrounding the event when the object was presented, 
indicative of retrieval using recollection; and Familiar judgements indicating that participants 
only knew that an object had been seen without memory for surrounding information, 
indicative of retrieval using familiarity. Based on Easton et al. (2012) as well as a recent paper 
by Saive and colleagues (2015), we predicted that contextual source memory would be more 
accurate following self-reported engagement of recollection compared to familiarity, but that 
temporal source memory would be equally accurate across judgements that engaged 
recollection or familiarity. 
 
2. Materials and Methods 
2.1. Experiment 1 
 
2.1.1. Virtual Environment and stimuli 
The virtual environment was created using the Valve Hammer World Editor (Valve 
Software, 2006), was projected onto a 375 cm x 250 cm screen at 1024 x 768 resolution, and 
was navigated through using a games console controller (Xbox 360, Microsoft). Participants 
were seated 420 cm from the wall. The virtual environment consisted of two rooms connected 
by a single doorway: a Start Room, where participants began each trial; and a Main Room where 
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they encountered stimuli, (Figure 1A). The Main Room had three windows facing a Courtyard. 
The Courtyard contained landmarks consisting of a sculpture, a car and a perimeter of buildings. 
Context was manipulated by altering the weather conditions in the Courtyard whilst keeping 
the landmarks constant. Six different contexts were used: sun, snow, lightning, rain, fog, and 
wind (Figure 1B). Rain used the appearance and sound of rain hitting the windows. Wind used 
leaves blowing in the courtyard and the sound of howling wind. Lightning used flashes and the 
sound of thunder. Sun used clear blue skies and bird song. Fog used grey mist and was silent. 
Snow used falling snowflakes and snow-covered ground and was silent. 
A pool of 186 3D stimuli from the Valve Hammer and Garry’s mod databases 
representing a range of everyday objects (see Figure 1A for examples) was used, from which 72 
were randomly drawn for each participant. 36 objects were presented in the virtual 
environment and the recognition test (targets), while the remaining 36 were only presented 
during the recognition test (lures). Instructions and memory test were displayed on a laptop 
using Psychophysics Toolbox version 3 (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner et al. 2007) for Matlab (Natick, 
MA, 2013). 
 
2.1.2. Participants 
There were 32 participants (22 female) with an average age of 21.8 years. Four 
participants stopped the study early, two due to feelings of nausea brought about by the high 
level of immersion, and two due to technical errors. The results from the remaining 28 (19 
female) participants with an average age of 22.0 years were used for analysis. Ethical approval 
for the study was obtained from the University of St Andrews’ University Teaching and 
Research Ethics Committee. All participants gave informed consent prior to taking part in the 
study. 
 
2.1.3. Procedure 
Each Study Phase consisted of six self-paced trials. During a single trial, participants 
made their way from the Start Room to the Main Room and located the stimulus behind the 
barrier. They were instructed to identify the object and judge its size relative to the surrounding 
furniture and give their response verbally, this response was not recorded but served as a 
measure to ensure that participants attended to the stimuli.  Participants then navigated back to 
the start room. This procedure was repeated until six objects had been encountered. Each time 
participants entered the Main Room a new object was presented and the context was changed 
(randomised according to a Latin Square design). Within each Study Phase, each stimulus was 
therefore associated with one context and one position in the sequence (1-6).   
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Each Test Phase consisted of 12 self-paced trials. Memory for the information seen in 
the virtual environment was assessed using four different questions per trial. First, to assess 
object recognition participants were first shown an image of an item on the screen and asked 
whether it was ‘old’ (seen in the Virtual Environment; indicated using the ‘1’ key) or whether it 
was ‘new’ (not seen in the Virtual Environment; indicated using the ‘0’ key).  
Following the object recognition participants were asked about the source of the item. 
Source questions either asked for the context the item was seen in or when in the presentation 
sequence the item was seen. There was a 50:50 ratio of context and sequence question in each 
test phase and the questions were randomised within participants. For both questions all 
response options were displayed on the screen simultaneously. Responses were given using the 
keys 1-6 on the keyboard. The order of the context response alternatives during the test phase 
did not map on to the sequence in which they were presented during study. This was to reduce 
the probability of participants using temporal information to retrieve context, and vice versa. 
Source questions were asked regardless of whether participants responded that the item was 
old or new. This was to allow for the analysis of source judgments in the absence of object 
recognition. If participants were certain that an item was new they were instructed to pick a 
source response at random.  Participants subsequently rated their confidence in their source 
response on a scale from 1 (low confidence) to 3 (high confidence).  Finally, having participants 
give a Remember (R), Familiar (F) or Guess (G) response, where Remember corresponded to 
recollection and Familiar to familiarity, assessed recollective experience. This question was 
asked last so as not to influence confidence assignment (Williams et al. 2013). Definitions for 
these judgements, adapted from Gardiner et al. (1996), were provided at the beginning of the 
experiment. Participants also had the option to review these definitions before each new test 
phase: 
• Remember - Recognition of the object brings back details of the experience when the object 
was encountered in the virtual world.  
• Familiar - Knowing that the object was encountered because of a feeling of familiarity, 
without recollecting the particular occurrence. 
• Guess - A decision strategy used when object information does not elicit either the 
experience of remembering or that of familiarity. 
 
There were six Study-Test Phases giving a total of 72 trials: 36 target trials (18 context trials 
and 18 sequence trials); and 36 lure trials. 
 
2.2. Experiment 2 
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2.2.1. Virtual Environment and stimuli 
The virtual environment was altered in Experiment 2 to create three stalls along the 
short wall of the main room in which the objects were placed (see Figure 1C and 1D). 
Items were drawn from the same pool as in Experiment 1, with 144 items randomly 
selected for each participant. 108 of these were seen in the Virtual Environment and 36 acted as 
lures in the test phase. 
 
2.2.2. Participants 
29 participants (20 female) with an average age of 22.7 were recruited. 5 participants 
stopped the study early due to technical errors. This left 24 participants (16 female) with an 
average age of 23.0 years whose data were analysed. 
 
2.2.3. Procedure 
The Study Phase in Experiment 2 followed the same structure as in Experiment 1, with 
the exception that three objects were seen in each trial, which across 6 study-test blocks of 6 
trials gave 108 to-be-remembered objects. In each trial an object was placed in each of the 3 
individual stalls with a barrier in front of each one. Participants were instructed to navigate to 
one stall at a time, on arrival at the stall the barrier would disappear and the object would be 
visible for five seconds before disappearing (Figure 3). 
Each Test Phase consisted of 12 self-paced trials, only 1 of the 3 to-be-remembered 
items from each study trial was presented. Aside from this the Test Phase was identical to that 
in Experiment 1. There were 6 study-test blocks resulting in a total of 36 target trials (18 
context and 18 sequence trials) and 36 new lure trials over the entire experiment. 
 
2.3. Statistics 
Due to some missing values, a linear mixed model (LMM) was used to analyse the effect 
of source (context/sequence) and recollective experience (Remember/Familiar) on accuracy of 
retrieval in both Experiment 1 and 2. The LMM was selected by fitting models with different 
covariance structures and choosing the most appropriate based on the model with the lowest 
Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). The covariance 
structures assessed were first-order autoregressive (AR1), unstructured, and compound 
symmetry. The LMM had source (context/sequence) and recollective experience 
(Remember/Familiar judgments) as repeated measures. Source and recollective experience 
were also entered as fixed factors along with a source by recollective experience interaction.  
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The model evaluation found that the AR1 covariance structure resulted in the lowest 
AIC and BIC values compared to compound symmetry and unstructured covariance structures, 
where lower AIC and BIC values indicate a better model fit (see Table 1 and 2 in Supplementary 
Materials for a comparison of covariance structures). 
Accuracy was further compared to chance level using one-sample t-tests in order to see 
whether performance in the context or sequence would be significantly above what would be 
expected if participants were merely guessing. Chance level performance was calculated as 1/6, 
as in each trial there was a 1 in 6 chance of getting the correct answer by simply guessing. 
To examine the possibility that retrieval of temporal information using familiarity was 
due to trace strength we examined serial position curves, plotting the proportion of error 
responses for both sequence and context questions. The aim was to characterise each source 
retrieval task as operating via a discrete threshold process, i.e. with randomly distributed 
errors, or via continuous trace strength process, i.e. error rates gradually dropping off as with 
increasing dissimilarity to the correct response option. For the sequence condition, this was 
carried out by examining the proportion of responses around items presented in the 3rd and 
4th sequence positions (3rd and 4th sequence position items, those in the middle of lists, were 
chosen to provide maximal opportunity to examine the tails of the serial position curves). For 
the context condition, serial position of incorrect responses was ordered according to frequency 
of incorrect response within each context. These distributions were then averaged across all 
contexts. It should be noted that the serial position ordering of the context condition items was 
carried out to give the greatest opportunity to uncover a gradual drop-off serial position curve, 
should one be present in the data.  
The proportion of error responses were compared to chance levels using one-sample t-
tests in order to see whether the frequency with which they were made differed from what 
would have been expected if participants were making errors at random. Here chance levels 
were calculated as 1 minus the proportion of correct responses, divided by the number of 
incorrect response options to give a level at which all errors could be distributed evenly.  
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Figure 1. A) Schematic of the Study and Test Phase in both experiments. Images in the Study 
Phase are from Experiment 1 where only one object was presented per trial. B) Overviews of 
the virtual environment and the outside landmarks for both Experiment 1 (top) and Experiment 
2 (bottom). C) Screenshots showing the stalls in which objects were found in Experiment 2. The 
top image shows one stall being opened while the other two remain unexplored. Bottom image 
shows all stalls being open with the images behind the panels being shown. 
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3. Results 
3.1. Experiment 1  
 
3.1.1. Object Recognition 
Object recognition accuracy was high, with the proportion of correctly identified targets 
(hits) and correctly identified lures (correct rejections) at .94 (SD=0.13) and 0.95 (SD=0.14) 
respectively. The proportion of R, F, and G responses was similar across context and sequence 
questions. R responses followed context hits at a rate of 0.81 (SD=0.29), with F at 0.15 
(SD=0.26) and G at 0.04 (SD=0.07). For sequence questions, R responses succeeded sequence 
hits at a rate of 0.86 (SD=0.26) F at 0.11 (SD=0.20) and G at 0.03 (SD=0.09). G responses, 
included to remove contamination of R and F responses by actual guesses (Gardiner et al., 
1996), were not analysed any further. A 2 (recollective experience: R/F) x2 (source: 
context/sequence) ANOVA comparing the R and F response rates for context and sequence, 
presented above, found a main effect of recollective experience, F(1,27)=65.20, p<0.001, ƞp2=0.71, 
meaning that R responses were given at a significantly higher rate than F responses. The main 
effect of source was nonsignificant, F(1,27)=0.40, p=0.84, ƞp2=0.001, as was the recollective 
experience by source interaction, F(1,27)=1.46, p=0.24, ƞp2=0.05, suggesting that the R and F 
response rates were not significantly different across context and sequence questions.  
 
3.1.2. Source memory by recollective experience 
For questions about contextual information, participants were more accurate when 
giving R judgments, 0.68 (SD=0.25), compared to when giving F judgments, 0.21 (SD=0.19). 
Responses for sequence questions followed a similar pattern with higher accuracy for R 
judgments, 0.74 (SD=0.23), than for F judgments, 0.43 (SD=0.33). The LMM showed that there 
was a significant effect of recollective experience (R/F judgments), β=-0.37, SE=0.79, p<0.001, 
indicating that source questions followed by R judgments were more accurate compared to F 
judgments across both context and sequence. The effect of source (context/sequence) was not 
significant, β=-0.57, SE=0.55, p=0.30, meaning that accuracy was not different between context 
and sequence questions. Nor was the source by recollective experience interaction significant, 
β=-0.11, SE=0.10, p=0.26. 
We hypothesised that accurate retrieval of contextual information could only be 
achieved using recollection and not familiarity, whereas sequence information could be 
retrieved accurately using both recollection and familiarity. However, to fully assess this, 
performance using the different retrieval strategies must be compared to chance performance 
to ensure that participants could accurately retrieve source information (Figure 2). Comparing 
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performance against chance levels using one-sample t-tests it was found that for context 
questions, performance was only above chance for R, t(25)=10.37, p<0.001, d=2.01, but not for F, 
t(15)=0.90, p=0.38, d=0.08. On the other hand, performance was above chance for both R, 
t(27)=12.99, p<0.001, d=1.85, and F for sequence questions, t(11)=2.82, p=0.02, d=0.80. This 
analysis indicates that context questions could only be answered above chance levels when 
based on recollection-based retrieval, whereas sequence judgments can be made correctly using 
either recollection or familiarity.  
 
3.1.3. Trace strength  
In the trace strength analysis for sequence errors (Figure 3A) in Experiment 1 only the 
proportion of errors for pos-1 (that is one sequential position behind the correct response) 
were significantly higher than chance level, t(27)=5.21, p<0.001. This indicates some forward 
asymmetry in error judgments where participants tended to make errors that were one step 
ahead of the correct option in the sequence. Analysis of context errors (Figure 3B) showed that 
the proportion of errors for Rank 1, which is the average of the most common error made for 
each context question, was above chance level, t(27)=2.26, p=0.032. None of the other ranks were 
above chance. 
 
3.1.4. Confidence judgments 
Examining confidence judgments, R judgments tended to be given high levels of 
confidence at 2.72 (SD=0.29) for context and 2.76 (SD=0.30) for sequence questions. F 
judgments, on the other hand, had somewhat lower confidence levels with 1.96 (SD=0.30) for 
context and 2.00 (SD=0.44) for sequence questions. A 2 (recollective experience: R/F) x2 
(source: context/sequence) ANOVA revealed a significant effect of recollective experience , 
F(1,8)=49.59, p<0.001, ƞp2=0.86, while no significant effect was found for source , F(1,8)=0.48, 
p=0.51, ƞp2=0.05, nor the source by recollective experience interaction, F(1,8)=0.002, p=0.96, 
ƞp2<0.001. This suggests that participants were making R judgments with significantly higher 
confidence compared to F judgments, independent of source. 
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Figure 2. Context and sequence accuracy by R and F judgments in A) Experiment 1, and B) 
Experiment 2. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. ** indicates p≤0.001 and * 
indicates p≤0.05 compared to chance level performance (dotted line, 0.1667).  
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3.2. Experiment 2  
 
3.2.1. Object recognition 
Experiment 2 addressed the high object recognition scores and relatively low 
proportion of Familiar responses in Experiment 1. Object discrimination remained relatively 
high, with hits at 0.85 (SD=0.19), and correct rejections at 0.92 (SD=0.18). Similar to Experiment 
1, proportions of R-F-G responses for correct source judgments were roughly equal following 
context hits, with R judgments being given 0.89 (SD =0.17) of the time and F  0.11 (SD =0.17), 
and sequence hits, where R judgments had a rate of 0.84 (SD =0.16) and F at 0.16 (SD =0.16). 
There were no G judgments for either context or sequence questions in Experiment 2. As there 
were no G judgments, the proportions of R and F judgments were not independent meaning that 
an ANOVA could not be carried out. Instead a paired sample t-test was used to compare the 
proportion of R responses between context and sequence questions. This t-test was non-
significant, t(22)=1.49, p=0.15, indicating that the proportions of R judgments given to context 
and sequence questions were not different, and in extension neither were the proportions of F 
judgments for context and sequence significantly different. 
 
3.2.2. Source memory by recollective experience 
Context accuracy was higher when justified by R judgments, 0.47 (SD=0.29) compared 
to when justified by F judgments, 0.25 (SD=0.34). The same pattern, although attenuated, was 
seen for sequence questions where accuracy followed by R judgments were 0.53 (SD=0.21) 
relative to an accuracy of 0.38 (SD=0.32) for sequence questions followed by F judgments. 
Results from the LMM revealed that there was no significant effect of recollective experience in 
Experiment 2, β=-0.15, SE=0.82, p=0.07, suggesting that accuracy was not difference between R 
and F judgments across context and sequence questions. Furthermore, the effect of source, β=-
0.06, SE=0.69, p=0.35, as well as the source by recollective experience interaction, β=-0.07, 
SE=0.11, p=0.48, were non-significant.  
As in Experiment 1, accurate retrieval of source information was examined using one 
sample t-tests.  These demonstrated that for context questions performance was above chance 
for R, t(23)=5.16, p<0.001, d=1.05, but not for F, t(17)=1.01, p=0.33, d=0.24. For time questions, 
performance was above chance for both R, t(23)=8.70, p<0.001, d=1.77, and F, t(19)=3.07, p=0.006, 
d=0.67. This again demonstrates that participants could only answer context questions 
accurately using recollection, but not familiarity. Sequence questions, on the other hand, could 
be answered accurately using both recollection and familiarity. 
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3.2.3. Trace strength 
In the trace strength analysis In Experiment 2, the proportion of errors were above 
chance for pos1, t(23)=2.62, p=0.015,  and neg1, t(23)=3.35, p=0.003. Here errors cluster around 
the correct temporal position which could argue for the use of trace strength to retrieve 
temporal information. Having a general idea of when in the sequence an item was presented 
this could narrow the correct temporal accuracy down to a scale of +1 to -1 position, in line with 
trace strength spanning the most temporal proximal positions. 
For context errors in Experiment 2, only the proportion of error judgments for Rank 1 
was above chance level, t(23)=2.34, p=0.028. Similar to the sequence errors, the proportions of 
context errors were not randomly distributed across all response options. Instead incorrect 
responses tended to cluster in the most common error response category.  
 
3.2.4. Confidence levels 
Confidence judgments, R judgments for context and sequence were 2.43 (SD=0.58) and 
2.39 (SD=0.46) respectively. For F judgments confidence levels were lower at 1.55 (SD=0.36) for 
context questions and 1.64 (SD=0.41) for sequence. A 2 (recollective experience: R/F) x2 
(source: context/sequence) ANOVA was run, again showing a main effect of recollective 
experience, F(1,14)=61.08, p<0.001, ƞp2=0.81, but not for source, F(1,14)=0.27, p=0.61, ƞp2=0.02, nor 
the interaction between source and recollective experience, F(1,14)=0.87, p=0.36, ƞp2=0.06. As in 
Experiment 1 this demonstrates that R judgments were overall more confident than F 
judgments across both context and sequence questions.  
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Figure 3. A) Proportion of error responses for sequence judgments for Experiment 1 (top) and 
Experiment 2 (bottom). 0 corresponds to correct responses, while positive and negative 
integers indicate the temporal position of responses after or before the correct response. B) 
Proportion of error responses for context questions in Experiment 1 (top) and Experiment 2 
(bottom). C indicates the proportion of correct responses across contexts. Rank 1 (R1) 
corresponds to the average of the most frequent error for each type of context, Rank 2 (R2) is 
the average of the 2nd most frequent error, etc. Dotted lines indicate chance level. Error bars 
represent confidence intervals. 
 
4. Discussion 
Our hypothesis, based on the operationalisation of recollection within the dual process 
model (Yonelinas, 2001) and a previous study examining retrieval processes underpinning the 
WWWhich and WWWhen paradigms (Easton et al., 2012; Saive et al., 2015), was that accurate 
memory for objects in context would only be possible using a recollection strategy, while 
accurate memory for objects within a sequence would be supported by either recollection or 
familiarity. Results from the two experiments presented here support this hypothesis. We 
demonstrated that while context can only be accurately retrieved using recollection (the 
retrieval process underpinning R responses), temporal sequence information can be retrieved 
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accurately using either recollection or familiarity (the retrieval process underpinning F 
responses). 
There are two ways in which these data can be interpreted. The first is that the time an 
event took place (here defined as its place in a sequence) cannot be used as a source as this 
would mean it should only be possible to retrieve that information using recollection. This 
would have implications for using temporal information as a basis for the definition of episodic 
memory and for using the WWWhen paradigm to model it in animals. Alternatively these data 
could show that familiarity can be used to retrieve some kinds of source information 
(time/sequence) and as such should be considered to be as ‘episodic’ as recollection.  
While these results do not discount time as a valid source in episodic memory as it can 
be retrieved using recollection, they do highlight that there are instances in which the retrieval 
of temporal information violates the assumptions of source memory under the dual process 
theory, where memory for a source is argued to rely on recollection alone (Yonelinas, 1999). 
What is clear from our data is that context information does conform to the accepted view of 
source information in that it can only be retrieved using recollection and as such this supports a 
more inclusive model of episodic memory in which events are defined by their occasion, 
including both time and context (Eacott & Easton, 2010; Eacott & Norman, 2004), rather than by 
temporal information alone as suggested by what-where-when memory (Cheke & Clayton, 
2010; Eichenbaum & Fortin, 2003).  
These results can also be viewed in relation to the unitization of stimulus-source 
associations. In some instances an item and its source, can be encoded as a unit and be retrieved 
without reference to other units using familiarity. However, for other events sources are 
encoded as separate units from the item and so memory of the event requires an association to 
be made between item and source. Retrieval of this integrated memory requires recollection 
(Diana et al. 2011; Diana et al. 2008; Yonelinas, 1999). In the case of the present study, item-
context associations might have been encoded through the latter process, where weather 
conditions were encoded as a separate unit to the object. On the contrary, sequence information 
might instead be encoded as a feature of the item itself similar to colour and size, thus enabling 
the use of familiarity in correct retrieval (Yonelinas, 1999, 2002). It has been suggested that 
some associative memory might be influenced by a degree of familiarity, such as temporal order 
judgments relying on the trace strength of an item to be placed in time (Yonelinas, 2002). While 
we asked participants for specific temporal judgments (i.e. the exact temporal position an item 
was presented) rather than a relative judgment, it is unlikely that our task could have been 
solved solely by the use of trace strength. Trace strength could, however, have contributed 
towards an accurate judgment by distinguishing the correct option from more distant 
sequential positions and in that way narrowed down the window of plausible responses. Some 
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evidence supporting this was found in the trace strength analysis where it was shown that 
errors in temporal judgments tended to cluster around the correct response, and that the 
proportions of such error judgments were significantly greater than expected by chance. The 
use of familiarity to accurately retrieve sequential information might pose a problem for 
theories of temporal memory where time is seen as an entirely separate component to item and 
space (Eichenbaum & Fortin, 2003; Kraus et al., 2013). The current findings suggest that in 
some circumstances time might not be encoded separately from the object or event, but rather 
as another feature. 
Another interesting finding is that participants did not use temporal information 
supported by familiarity to retrieve contexts, for example by knowing that an item was the third 
in the sequence and that snow was the third context. This is consistent with Easton et al. who 
showed that even when participants only need to remember the order of two contexts they do 
not combine this with familiarity supported temporal information to solve the task. This is 
perhaps not surprising as this strategy would be much harder to use in the current experiments 
as participants would need to remember the order of the 6 context presentations at encoding. 
However, this reinforces the finding that familiarity supported temporal judgement are not 
combined with other information to help remember specific episodes. 
It has recently been suggested that recollection of associations between objects and the 
contexts in which they were experienced is aided by semantic links between the two (Saive et 
al., 2015). For example, recollection of finding a beach ball on a beach may be aided by the 
semantic link. However, semantic information cannot be used to recall the time at which (or 
place within a sequence) the beach ball was experienced. In the current study this could mean 
that semantic links between the objects and the contexts would make retrieval of contextual 
sources easier. This was not found to be the case, however, as participants’ ability to accurately 
recollect time at which an object was experienced was better than their ability to recollect the 
context in which objects were experienced suggesting that semantic links to context do not 
increase participants’ ability to recognise an object. 
A further consideration is what our findings tell us about the use of time to disambiguate 
previously experienced events. Counter to the widespread acceptance in the human cognitive 
literature of familiarity and recollection as complementary episodic retrieval processes (Diana, 
Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2007; Yonelinas, 1994, 2002), some authors have suggested that 
familiarity is a less episodic process than recollection (Easton et al., 2012; Holland & Smulders, 
2011). According to this view, the fact that tasks using time to disambiguate events can be 
solved using familiarity would call into question the validity of using time in tests of episodic 
memory.  However, one important consideration here is that there are many ways to think of 
and define time in relation to memory (Crystal, 2010; Friedman, 1993). In the present study we 
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have used place in a sequence to define time of an event but other studies have utilised 
measures of time, such as how long ago (Clayton & Dickinson, 1998; Roberts et al., 2008) or 
what time of day an event took place (Zhou & Crystal, 2009). While it is clear that place in a 
sequence can be remembered using familiarity it could be that these other measures of time 
might require recollection for accurate retrieval. 
Nevertheless, sequence memory has successfully been implemented in models of 
episodic-like memory (Ergorul & Eichenbaum, 2004), and been demonstrated to rely on the 
hippocampus (Agster, Fortin, & Eichenbaum, 2002; Devito & Eichenbaum, 2011; Fortin, Agster, 
& Eichenbaum, 2002), which has been shown to be a critical part of the network that processes 
episodic memory (Burgess, Maguire, & O’Keefe, 2002; Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1991; Vargha-
Khadem, 1997). Data from the current experiment might help to explain these findings. Our data 
show that while sequence memory can be solved using familiarity the most accurate and 
common process used to recall sequence information is recollection. Given that the 
hippocampus has been implicated in accurate use of recollection (Fortin, Wright, & Eichenbaum, 
2004; Sauvage, Fortin, Owens, Yonelinas, & Eichenbaum, 2008; Diana et al., 2007; for review see 
Eichenbaum et al., 2007), it is not surprising that humans and animals with damage to the 
hippocampus are impaired at remembering position within a sequence. Damage to the 
hippocampus would remove participants’ ability to use recollection to solve the task resulting in 
a deficit. However, these participants would still be able to use familiarity to solve the task even 
though it is less accurate. This is consistent with the fact that animals with hippocampal lesions 
are above chance in some measures of sequence memory even though they are impaired 
relative to controls (Fortin et al. 2002).  
 
5. Conclusions 
The current data support the hypothesis that the contextual features of an event can 
only be retrieved from memory using a recollection strategy. This is consistent with context 
information being used as a source for episodic memory and supports a more inclusive 
definition that does not rely solely on temporal information to disambiguate events. They also 
suggest that while temporal information can be used as a source in some circumstances there 
are occasions in which it can be retrieved using a strategy based on familiarity. This could be 
interpreted as showing that time is not always a source, that time can be encoded as an intrinsic 
feature of an item or that familiarity can sometimes be used to retrieve source information.  
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Disambiguating past events: Accurate source memory for time and context depends on different retrieval 
processes, NLM-15-378  
Highlights: 
Context of encoding events can only be retrieved from memory using recollection. 
Time of encoding events can be retrieved using either recollection or familiarity. 
Familiarity based time judgements are based on memory trace strength. 
 
 
